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THE NEW YORK CITY CARBON CHARGE ("NY3C"):
UNLOCKING LOCALITIES' POWER TO FIGHT CLIMATE
CHANGE
Jeremy M. Vaida
"We were called here. . . to systematically address the danger of
climate change with every tool we have. And it's increasingly clear
that we, the local leaders of the world, have many tools - more than
we may have in fact realized - and ... we must use them boldly,
even as our national governments hesitate."
1
- New York Mayor Bill de Blasio
INTRODUCTION
Climate change, many argue, is this generation's greatest
2
challenge. Caused principally by the accumulation of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere, climate change will eventually increase
the surface temperature of the Earth, melt the polar ice caps, raise sea
levels, acidify the oceans, and generally transform the ecology of the
Earth beyond anything humanity has encountered since the dawn of
civilization.3
To combat this accelerating threat, nations and states have
implemented policies to curb the unrelenting release of carbon
1. Transcript: Mayor de Blasio Delivers Remarks at "Modem Slavery
and Climate Change: The Commitment of the Cities" at the Pontifical
Academy of Sciences, Bill de Blasio, available at wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-
the-mayor/news/502-15/transcript-mayor-de-blasio-delivers-remarks-
modem-slavery-climate-change-commitment [https://perma.cc/6GV6-
LHAL].
2. "CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, SYNTHESIS REPORT," Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, p. v, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR AR5_FINAL full.pdf [https://perma.cc/999G-G9HK].
3. Id. at 39-54.
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dioxide into the atmosphere. 4 Carbon markets 5 and carbon taxes 6 are
currently the most widely adopted carbon fighting tools. In both
instances, governments put a price on the release of carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere and thereby discourage those activities that result
in carbon emissions.
Unfortunately, to date, these carbon-pricing mechanisms have had
only limited efficacy in reducing overall carbon output. While
growth in carbon emissions is slowing, they continue to rise year
after year.7 In order to arrest, and eventually remediate, the effects of
climate change, greater efforts must be made to limit the amount of
carbon released into the atmosphere. 8
In the United States, the Obama administration has used its
executive authority to increase fuel economy in motor vehicles, and
thus has successfully decreased the overall carbon footprint of
Americans' primary mode of transportation. 9 More recently, the
administration has sought to aggressively regulate carbon under the
4. "Carbon dioxide emissions," "carbon emissions," and "carbon" will
be used interchangeably throughout.
5. THE CARBON BRIEF, http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/05/the-
state-of-carbon-pricing-around-the-world-in-46-carbon-markets/, last
visited December 5, 2015 ("carbon markets" refer principally to cap-and-
trade regimes wherein governments cap the overall amount of carbon that
can be emitted in a given jurisdiction or group of jurisdiction and then issue
a limited number of permits to emit up to the cap on yearly basis. Permit
holders can then buy or sell permits on a secondary market).
6. CARBON TAX CENTER, http://www.carbontax.org/where-carbon-is-
taxed/#Other, (carbon taxes impose a direct cost on carbon emissions,
usually a fixed rate on a per metric ton of carbon dioxide basis), last visited
December 5, 2015 [https://perma.cc/4U62-UKF4].
7. "Global C02 Emissions Increase to New All-Time Record, But
Growth is Slowing Down," The European Commission, Joint Research
Centre, https:Hec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/global-co2-emissions-increase-
new-all-time-record-growth-slowing-down, last visited December 5, 2015
[https://perma.cc/J53J-PAHQ].
8. "CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, SYNTHESIS REPORT," Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, p. 77, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR AR5 FINAL full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JTK-FN6B].
9. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION FINALIZES HISTORIC 54.5 MPG FUEL
EFFICIENCY STANDARDS, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/obama-
administration-finalizes-historic- 545-mpg-fuel-efficiency- standard, last
visited December 5, 2015 [https://perma.cc/XX8D-NC3X].
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Clean Air Act by limiting the amount of carbon dioxide that can be
released from power plants.10 Some states have also attempted to
limit carbon emissions through carbon markets, like the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Western Climate Initiative."
Despite this considerable progress, an oppositional Congress 12 and
political polarization have made a comprehensive national carbon
reduction solution unlikely.
Nevertheless, significant local action is possible. Today, cities are
the largest contributors to climate change. 13 An astonishing 75% of
all human-generated carbon dioxide emissions are sourced from
urban areas. 14 Interestingly, though, in the United States, urban
dwellers are significantly more concerned about, and motivated to
address, climate change relative to other constituencies. 15 Localities
are also generally more nimble and experimental as compared to state
or federal governments. Therefore, even though cities are the largest
contributors to climate change, they might be the best able to combat
it.
This paper seeks to provide a blueprint for unlocking
municipalities' latent power to regulate carbon emissions within their
jurisdictions through the use of a carbon charge. Using New York
City as a case study, this paper argues that municipalities could
immediately impose strict climate pricing, guided by market
principles, by imposing such a levy. Part I provides the legal
justification for a New York City specific carbon charge while Part II
discusses how such a regime might operate in practice.
10. "FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT OBAMA TO ANNOUNCE HISTORIC
CARBON POLLUTION STANDARDS FOR POWER PLANTS," August 03, 2015,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-
president-obama-announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards, last visited
December 5, 2015 [https://perma.cc/6MXS-5GTV].
11. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org, last
visited December 5, 2015 [https://perma.cc/YW2C-5LFP].
12. Id.
13. CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME,
http: //www.unep.org/resourceefficiency /Policy /ResourceEfficientCities/Foc
usAreas/CitiesandClimateChange/tabid/101665/Default.aspx, last visited
December 5, 2015 [https://perma.cc/LF5V-3HKF].
14. Id.
15. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION,
http://environment.yale.edu/poe/v2014/ [https://perma.cc/S842-2XTP].
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I. LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
Localities are generally restricted by state and federal law in their
ability to raise revenue. Thus, in order for a locality to legally
impose a levy like a carbon charge, it must thread the needle of local,
state, and federal jurisprudence. The following section discusses
each level of authority in turn, building a legal foundation for a
locally enforceable carbon charge.
A. STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
The source of all local authority, in the state of New York and
elsewhere, is derived from state constitutions and statutes. 16
Beginning with Article IX of the New York state constitution,
localities are generally empowered to make laws. 7 Cities and towns
are given greatest latitude with regard to laws pertaining to local
"property, affairs or government." 18 However, municipal
governments 19 are also permitted to enact laws with respect to local
"protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons
or property" in their territorial jurisdiction.20 The aforementioned
powers, as well as a few others, are also codified in New York
State's "Municipal Home Rule Law" and the "Statute on Local
Governments."z1
Assuming a locality is generally authorized to enact a particular
ordinance, local laws may nevertheless be preempted by state law. If
a more particular state statute expresses intent to supersede local law,
is practically in conflict with local law, or generally occupies a
particular field of regulation, local ordinances will yield to the state
16. "Adopting Local Laws in New York State," James A. Coon Local
Government Technical Series, p. 1, reprinted 2015, available at
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/AdoptingLocalLaws in NewYo
rk State.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVL7-ALRV].
17. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1 (a).
18. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
19. "Local governments," "municipal governments," and city, town, and
village governments are all used interchangeably.
20. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c)(10).
21. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 1, et seq. (McKinney 2016); N.Y. Stat.
Law § Loc. Govts § 10, etseq (McKinney 2016).
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22law. Silence in the law, though, will often counsel in favor of local
control.
As previously discussed, New York City is expressly permitted to
enact laws related to the "health and well-being of persons" within its
23jurisdiction. Pursuant to that authority, New York City enacted the
"New York City Air Pollution Control Code" 24 (the "Code") to
"promote health, safety and welfare, prevent injury to human, plant
and animal life and property, foster the comfort and convenience of
its inhabitants and, to the greatest degree practicable, facilitate the
enjoyment of the natural attractions of the city."25 The Code permits
New York City's Commissioner of Environmental Protection to
take such action as may be necessary to control the emission of air
contaminant which causes or may cause, by itself or in combination
with other air contaminant, detriment to the safety, health, welfare or
comfort of the public or to a part thereof, injury to plant and animal
life, or damage to property or business. The commissioner may
exercise or delegate any of the functions, powers and duties vested in
him or her or in the department by this code. The commissioner may
adopt such rules, regulations and procedures as may be necessary to
26
effectuate the purposes of this chapter.
"Air contaminant" is broadly defined as "any particulate matter or
any gas or any combination thereof in the open air, other than
uncombined water or air." New York's Air Pollution Control Code
"is to be liberally construed so as to effectuate its stated purpose, i.e.,
controlling and reducing air pollution." 
27
Carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere through the burning of
fossil fuels or the use of electricity is not "uncombined water or air"
and has, in fact, been explicitly labeled an air pollutant by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 28 Furthermore, the Code asserts
its authority to regulate "any products of combustion or incomplete
22. Albany Area Builders' Assn. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d
372,379 (N.Y. 1989); Monroe-Livingston v. Town of Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d
679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1980).
23. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c)(10).
24. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 24-101.
25. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 24-102.
26. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 24-105.
27. Liberty Lines Exp., Inc. v. N.Y,C, Envt'l Control Bd., 160 A.D.2d
295, 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
28. Massachusetts v. E,P,A., 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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combustion resulting from the use of fuel burning equipment or
refuse burning equipment." 29 Consequently, New York City almost
certainly has the statutory and constitutional authority necessary to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions within the city limits. To date,
none have challenged this authority.
30
New York City's authority to regulate air pollution, however, does
not necessarily permit it to levy a charge against carbon emitters.
While New York City is provided great latitude in enacting local
legislation related to health and welfare, its ability to impose taxes is
limited. New York City, like all the other municipalities of New
York State, may only levy taxes that are "authorized by the [state]
legislature."31 The full constraints on localities' power to tax are
found under Article 29 of New York State's tax statute. 32 While
New York City is authorized to impose a number of different types of
taxes, the City is not permitted to levy a tax on carbon emissions.
33
Nevertheless, New York City may be allowed to enact a carbon
charge under state law if the levy is considered a fee as opposed to a
tax. Fees, unlike taxes, are not constrained by the state's limitations
34on taxes. When determining whether a particular levy is a tax or a
35fee, courts first look to the legislative intent. Simply naming a
29. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 24-102.
30. See Kizzy M. Charles-Guzman, "Air Pollution Control Strategies in
New York City: A Case Study of the Role of Environmental Monitoring,
Data Analysis, and Stakeholder Networks in Comprehensive Government
Policy Development," p. 29, December 2012, available at
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/94532/Kizzy / 20C
harles-Guzman%20practicum%20120312.pdfsequence- 1.
31. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c)(8).
32. N.Y. Tax Law art. 29 (McKinney 2015).
33. Under N.Y. Tax Law art. 29, New York City is authorized to impose
taxes on: §1201(a) - occupations and privileges, holding or occupying
property, possessing or exercising a franchise, sales and gross receipts; §
1201(b) - transfers of real estate; § 1201(c) and (1) - coin operated
amusements; § 1201(d) -beer, wine, and spirits; § 1201(e) and (g) - motor
vehicles and motor vehicle registration; § 1201(f) - certain types of
containers; § 1201(i) - movie theatre admissions; § 1201(j) - taxicab
licenses.
34. Am. Sugar Ref Co. of New York v. Waterfront Comm. of NY
Harbor, 432 N.E.2d 578, 583 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed N. Y, Shipping
Assn. Inc. v. Waterfront Coin 'n ofN.Y, Harbor, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982).
35. Id. at 25.
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charge one or the other is insufficient. 36 Instead, a court must
conduct an extensive fact-sensitive examination and balance a
number of competing factors.
For instance, levies that are imposed predominantly for the purpose
of raising general revenue are typically considered taxes.37 Likewise,
charges imposed for the purpose of defraying the cost of government
38services in general are also considered taxes. If a charge is
implemented by the legislature then it is typically considered a tax.
39
By contrast, fees are considered "a visitation of the costs of special
services upon the one who derives a benefit from them ' 40 and are
used to defray the cost of particular, as opposed to general, services.
41
Additionally, if a levy's primary purpose is to regulate, as opposed to
raise revenue, then it will more often be considered a fee. 42
Regulatory intent can be demonstrated if the levy is implemented by
an administrative agency as opposed to the legislature.43 In any
event, fees "should be assessed or estimated on the basis of reliable
factual studies or statistics.
44
In an effort to more easily identify fees, some commentators break
such charges down into three broad categories: user fees, also known
as "commodity charges," 4 5 inspection, processing, and licensing
fees, 46 and "burden-offset charges .,
47
36. Franklin Soc'y for Home Bldg. & Sav. v. Bennett, 282 N.Y. 79, 84
(N.Y. 1939).
37. NY, Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 200 A.D.2d 315, 317 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994).
38. Am. Sugar Ref Co., 432 N.E.2d at 583; Joslin v. Regan, 406
N.Y.S.2d 938, 941-42, (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) affd. 48 N.Y.2d 746.
39. Am. Ins. Ass 'n v. Lewis, 50 N.Y.2d 617, 623-24 (N.Y. 1980).
40. Joslin, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (quoting Jewish Reconstructionist
Synagogue of the N. Shore, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Roslyn Harbor, 352 N.E.2d
115, 117 (N.Y. 1976)).
41. Hanson v. Griffiths, 124 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
42. Am. Sugar, 55 N.Y.2d at 26-27; see also Radio Common Carriers of
N.Y., Inc. v. State.601 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (citing Nat'l
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974)).
43. Am. Ins. Ass 'n, 50 N.Y.2d at 623-24.
44. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 40 N.Y.2d at 163.
45. Eben Albert-Knopp, The California Gas Charge and Beyond: Taxes
and Fees in a Changing Climate, 32 VT. L. REV. 217, 223 (2007); Hugh D.
Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335,
343-44 (2003).
46. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 227; Spitzer, supra at 349.
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User fees/commodity charges are typically imposed when the
government acts like a private sector business and provides a specific
good or service to ratepayers, such as water or electricity. 48
Generally, such fees can only be imposed on those receiving a benefit
from the fee's payment.49 Additionally, the rate must often mirror
the government's costs in providing the good or service.5 °
Inspection, processing, or licensing fees51 are generally used to
cover the cost of regulating licensees, such as those for motor vehicle
operators or professionals, processing applications, like building
permits, or conducting inspections, such as health or building
inspections. 52 Like user fees, inspection, processing, and licensing
fees may not exceed the cost of regulation and can only be imposed
on persons who benefit in some way from the fee.
53
Burden-offset charges are unlike the prior two fees in that the
ratepayer does not have to obtain a benefit for the fee to be valid.54
Instead, burden-offset charges attempt to counteract the costs the
ratepayer's actions impose on society at large.55 Such fees typically
include garbage and wastewater fees or fees related to the cost of
pollution.56
While according to the above rubric a carbon charge would likely
qualify as a burden offset charge, shorthand alone is insufficient to
determine whether a carbon charge would be considered a fee or a
tax under New York state law. Instead, careful consideration of the
47. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 226; Spitzer, supra note 45, at 345-
46.
48. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 223; Spitzer, supra note 45, at 343-
44.
49. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 454 (1978);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621-23 (1981).
50. See, e.g., Massechusetts, 435 U.S. at 454 (though a rough
approximation can be sufficient); Commonwealth Ed. Co., 453 U.S. at 622-
623 (1981).
51. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 227; Spitzer, supra note 45, at 349.
52. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 227; Spitzer, supra note 45, at 349.
53. Spitzer, supra note 45, at 349-50. See Albert-Knopp, supra note 45,
at 227.
54. See Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 226; Spitzer, supra note 45, at
345.
55. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 226; Spitzer, supra note 45, at 345.
56. Albert-Knopp, supra note 45, at 226; Spitzer, supra note 45, at 346-
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particular facts and circumstances surrounding the putative levy, and
comparison to applicable case law, is required.
New York State has wrestled with the distinction between taxes
and fees since at least 1896. In the case of People ex rel. Einsfeld v.
Murray, the New York Court of Appeals considered a fee imposed
58by the state legislature as part of a liquor traffic control regime.
The fee operated by adding a surcharge to liquor trafficking licenses
provided by local jurisdictions. 59 Only persons who obtained the
requisite liquor trafficking license, and paid the applicable fee, could
peddle in liquors and other spirits. 60 The fee was challenged on the
basis that it was a tax that did not garner the requisite two-thirds
61
majority for passage.
The court dismissed the challengers' arguments, finding that the
levy was clearly a fee and not a tax because the charge's principle
62purpose was to regulate the behavior of liquor traffickers. In fact,
the fee aimed to discourage the traffic of liquors generally. 63 The fee
served "a double purpose, to discourage the business [of liquor
trafficking] and to secure indemnity in part to the public from the
losses and burdens which the business is likely to entail.
64
At the time, it was thought that trafficking in liquors was "a
business dangerous to public morals [and which involved] public
burdens. 65 Consequently it was appropriate to levy an exaction to
discourage the activity.66 This so called "excise tax"6 7 was "for the
protection of the community and not for the protection of the person
57. See People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 44 N.E. 146, 149 (N.Y. 1896).
58. Id. at 146.
59. Id. at 148.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 146.
62. Id. at 149.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Excise taxes today no longer carry this definition. It is clear from the
context that what the court here calls an "excise tax" would now be
considered a burden-offset charge.
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from whom [the fee] [was] exacted., 68 Thus the "tax" was really a
fee 69
Taxes and fees were later compared in the case of American Sugar
Refining Co. of New York v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor. There, the state's highest court examined a fee established
by the Waterfront Commission Compact, an interstate agreement
between New York and New Jersey that, among other things,
required steamship companies, and other businesses related to the
operation of the New York Harbor, to pay 2% of their gross payroll
into a fund, which financed vacation and pension benefits to the
longshoreman who worked in the Port of New York. 70 The
Commission levied the fee because while longshoremen worked on
an hourly basis for a variety of different companies depending on the
day, no single company provided health and other benefits. 71
Nevertheless, the longshoremen effectively worked for the entire
New York Harbor 72 and so the Commission found it was appropriate
for the whole industry to bear part of the cost of providing for the
longshoremen's benefits.73
A number of steamship companies, and others, challenged the fee,
in part, on the basis that it was an impermissibly enacted tax.74 The
68. People ex rel. Einsfeld, 44 N.E. at 149.
69. It should be noted that the holding in the case of Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), a case invalidating Hawaii's 20% excise
tax which effectively only affected out of state liquor distributors, should
not serve to undermine the holding of People ex rel. Einsfeld, despite the
fact that People ex rel. Einsfeld concerns the regulation of intoxicating
liquors. Ultimately, the Court in Bacchus Imports found that the broad
powers to regulate alcohol provided to the Several States by Clause 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment did not permit the states to enact legislation
violative of the dormant commerce clause. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at
276. Bacchus Imports should not be read to undermine earlier cases on the
sole basis that they discuss the regulation of alcohol. At its most basic,
People ex rel. Einsfeld stands for the proposition that levies that serve a
predominantly regulatory purpose by deterring a social ill should be
considered fees and not taxes. See People ex. rel. Einselfd, 44 N.E. 146.
This holding is not disturbed by the Bacchus Imports commerce clause
analysis.
70. Am. Sugar, 432 N.E.2d at 583.
71. Id. at 582.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 579-80.
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Court of Appeals disagreed and found that the levy was a permissible
assessment, within the ambit of the Waterfront Commission
Compact's regulatory authority.
75
In discussing why the levy was a fee and not a tax, the court noted
that its primary purpose was to regulate. 76 The fee sought to
"eliminate[] the evils in employment and employment practices and
the adverse effect of those practices on the commerce of the port" by
effectively standardizing the benefits for longshoremen. 77 Without
this program, longshoremen could be abused by unfair employment
practices. 78 Interestingly, the court found that the benefits of this fee
actually redounded to the employers by "correct[ing] the evils" of
exploitive business practices, even though the money collected was
ultimately paid to the longshoremen.
79
A carbon charge, like the fees described in People ex rel. Einsfeld
and American Sugar Refining Co., would similarly attempt to
regulate behavior by curbing carbon emissions. To fall within the
confines of the case law, its principal purpose could not be to raise
revenue, but rather to regulate behavior. Furthermore, any revenue it
did generate would have to be directed to a special fund, as opposed
to the general budget.
Both People ex rel. Einsfeld and American Sugar Refining Co.,
however, only discussed state level levies. Therefore, based on the
above, it is unclear whether a carbon charge could survive on the
local level. However, in Torsoe Brothers Construction Corp. v.
Board of Trustees of Inc., Monroe, the Second Department of the
Appellate Division touched on whether a local "tap-in" fee was so
onerous and far reaching as to be considered a tax. 80 There, the
Village of Monroe enacted an ordinance requiring buildings that
wished to tap into the municipality's water system to pay a fee,
which escalated in price depending on the size of the tap. 81 Monroe
75. Id. at 583.
76. Id. at 585 ("A license fee has for its primary purpose the regulation
or restriction of a business deemed in need of public control, the cost of
such regulation being imposed upon the business benefited or controlled,
whereas the primary purpose of a tax is to raise money for support of the
government generally.") (citation omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 375 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
81. Id. at 614.
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then passed a resolution authorizing a $1,840,000 bond for municipal
water improvements, which was financed by the tap-in fee.
82
The court conceded that Monroe had the requisite legal authority to
impose a fee for connecting to the village's water system, 83 but was
troubled by the fact that the levy was used to fund general water
improvements. 84 In the court's view, the charge could only be as high
as the reasonable cost of regulating the current water system. 85 To the
extent that the fee was used to fund a general public works project,
like water improvements, the levy would be considered a tax.
86
In a similar case, New York Telephone Co. v. City of Amsterdam,
the Third Department considered a $13 per square foot "excavation
fee" levied against persons who dug into municipal right-of-ways,
sidewalks, or greenbelts. 87 There, two telephone utilities sued the
City of Amsterdam to invalidate the fee on the basis that it was an
unauthorized tax.88 The court found that while the levy was named a
"fee," the revenue generated was placed into the town's general fund
and the $13 per square foot greatly exceeded the cost of "issuing the
excavation permit and subsequent inspections and enforcement."' 89
Consequently, the levy was struck down as an unauthorized tax.
90
These two Appellate Division cases are instructive because they
place a potential ceiling on a local fee's cost. Once a local fee begins
to exceed the reasonable cost of regulation, which the courts
generally define as the cost of issuing permits, inspection, and
enforcement, the levy ceases to look like a fee and begins to look like
a tax. Consequently, in order for a hypothetical carbon charge to be
considered a fee, its revenue must be restricted to regulation and
cannot be used to fund infrastructure projects, such as citywide
efficiency upgrades or renewable energy projects.
Based on the above, it seems that New York City would likely be
permitted to levy a carbon charge. New York City is authorized to
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id. at 616.
84. Id. at 617.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. N.Y Tel. Co. v. City of Amsterdam, 613 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994-95 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994).
88. Id. at 995.
89. Id. at 995-96.
90. Id. at 996.
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regulate air quality and has drafted the appropriate enabling
legislation to regulate carbon emissions. No state statute appears to
preempt local carbon regulation and the case law does not explicitly
prohibit a carbon charge. Consequently, New York City should be
permitted to enact such a fee, so long as it is: (1) expressly
regulatory; (2) does not exceed the cost of issuing permits,
conducting inspections, and enforcing the levy; and (3) is not used to
fund public works or the City's general revenue fund.
B. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS
Even if a hypothetical carbon charge fully complied with all
applicable state and local laws, such a charge could still potentially
be stricken down under federal law. Before determining whether a
New York City carbon charge could be legally imposed, the levy
must also be examined under federal principles.
Of the various federal limitations on state and local government,
there is perhaps none more important and far-reaching than the
dormant commerce clause. The Constitution empowers Congress
"[tlo regulate Commerce ... among the several States." 91 This
affirmative grant of power to Congress has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to also limit the states' ability to pass laws that
burden interstate commerce. 92 This doctrine, known as the dormant
commerce clause, is meant to protect against "state or municipal laws
whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite
those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was
designed to prevent.,
93
State and local laws that facially discriminate against foreign
jurisdictions are considered virtually per se invalid 94 and can only
survive scrutiny if the jurisdiction can demonstrate a "legitimate local
purpose[] that [cannot] adequately be served by available
91. U.S. Const., art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
92. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); see also Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
93. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
(quoting The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143-145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton); Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2
Writings of James Madison 362-363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
94. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Adver. Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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nondiscriminatory alternatives., 95 If, however, a state or local law is
"directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate
commerce that are only incidental," courts will take a more flexible
view. 96 Under the so-called Pike test, non-facially discriminatory
local laws will be upheld "unless the burden imposed on [interstate]
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." 97 When determining whether the local benefits of an
ordinance outweigh the burdens imposed on interstate commerce
courts consider "the nature of the local interest involved, and...
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
'
"
98
A broad based charge on all carbon dioxide emitted within a local
jurisdiction is not facially discriminatory as it is applied equally
against visitors and residents. Therefore, were New York City to
impose such a charge, it would likely only have to satisfy the less
rigorous Pike test in order to withstand a dormant commerce clause
analysis.
While no court has considered whether a local carbon charge
violates the dormant commerce clause, the case of Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co. is illustrative. 99  There, the Supreme
Court considered a state statute that banned certain non-reusable milk
cartons while permitting reusable ones. 100 The purpose of the law
was to mitigate what the state had identified as a solid waste
management problem by encouraging the use of reusable containers
and thus reduce the amount of garbage taken to land fill.101 Milk
producers challenged the law, in part, on the basis that it
unreasonably burdened interstate commerce.l12 The Supreme Court
disagreed and found that the law's incidental impact on interstate
commerce paled in comparison to the state's legitimate interest in
95. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151(1986); see also Brown-Forman
Distillers v. N.Y State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
96. United Haulers Ass 'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. at 624).
97. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, (1970).
98. Id.
99. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
100. Id. at 458.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 474.
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regulating a historically local area, like the environment. 103
Furthermore, the law treated both in state and out of state retailers
equally by preventing all of them from selling the non-reusable
containers in Minnesota.
10 4
Similarly, a local carbon charge would not burden visitors over
residents and would likewise regulate a local environmental concern.
Therefore, even though Clover Leaf Creamery considered a statewide
and not a local levy, the Court would likely be inclined to treat a
local carbon charge the same way. If anything, the Court may be
even more likely to permit a carbon charge because such a levy
would simply discourage carbon emissions instead of outright
banning them.
In addition to comporting with dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence, a local carbon charge must also not offend the
Supremacy Clause. Similar to state preemption, local laws can be
invalidated under the doctrine of federal preemption in three
circumstances: (1) when a federal statue expressly states its intent to
preempt a local law, (2) when the local law directly conflicts with
federal law, and (3) when localities attempt to legislate in an area
occupied by federal law.
10 5
Local ordinances are often found preempted by federal law when
they are classified as "Not in My Back Yard," or NIMBY,
legislation. 10 6 An example of NIMBY legislation occurred in the
case of Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey when
an ordinance passed by the Township of Lacey sought to prohibit the
transportation and storage or nuclear material within its territorial
jurisdiction. 107 In finding that Lacey's ordinance was field
preempted, the Third Circuit was particularly troubled by the fact that
the law operated as an "outright ban on ... radioactive materials." 108
A nearby nuclear power plant was authorized under federal law, so
103. Id. at 471-72.
104. Id. at 472.
105. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)
(discussing "conflict" preemption); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass 'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (discussing "field" preemption).
106. James R. May, Principles of Constitutional Environmental Law, ed.,
2011, Ch. 7, p. 181, available at http://www.rwglaw.com/pdf/Dupont-09-
11 .pdf [https://perma.cc/W4RJ-7WGE].
107. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d
1103 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986).
108. Id. at 1104-05.
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Lacey could not unilaterally frustrate the utility by banning nuclear
material in its jurisdiction. 0 9
While the federal courts are generally apprehensive in authorizing
NIMBY laws, courts have been more flexible in permitting local
laws related to air pollution. 110 The reason being that while the Clean
Air Act, the United States's marquee air pollution control legislation,
is broad and national in scope, the statute expressly recognizes that
''air pollution prevention ... and air pollution control at its source is
the primary responsibility of States and local governments[.]" '1 11 In
fact, "[a] primary goal of [the law] is to encourage or otherwise
promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions,
consistent with the provisions of [the Clean Air Act], for pollution
prevention." 112 Simply stated, far from precluding local action, the
Clean Air Act encourages localities to enact air pollution controls, as
long as they are no "less stringent that the [federal] standard."'1 13
Despite the Clean Air Act's express policy of local involvement, a
consortium of taxicab companies invoked the statute in their suit
against a New York City regulatory regime that sought to encourage
taxicabs to purchase hybrid and other low carbon impact vehicles
through monetary inducements in the case of Metro. Taxicab Bd. of
Trade v. City of N.Y.114 In that case, a New York City ordinance
permitted taxicab fleet owners to charge more money for hybrid and
clean diesel taxis as compared to the older, less fuel efficient models,
encouraging them to lease out the cleaner cars.
115
While the Second Circuit did ultimately strike down the regime,
finding that the law was preempted by the Energy Policy
Conservation law's motor fuel standards provisions, the court did not
opine on whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air
Act. 116 Interestingly, the United States government, in an amicus
brief, argued that the regulation was permissible under the Clean Air
109. Id.
110. Cf S.E. Oakland County Res. Recovery Auth. v. City of Madison
Heights, 5 F.3d 166 (6th Cir. 1993).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 01(c).
114. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of N.Y, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.
2010).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 158.
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Act.' 17 In a similar case before the Northern District of Texas, the
court held that the Clean Air Act would not serve to preempt a Dallas
ordinance that gave preferential treatment to taxicab drivers that
operated vehicles powered by natural gas over those powered by
ordinary gasoline and diesel engines. 1 8
Therefore, even though the federal courts have not considered the
efficacy of a carbon charge under the Clean Air Act, recent cases,
and the opinion of the United States government, seem to suggest
that localities have some latitude in enforcing air quality regulations
without offending preemption principles. Were New York City to
enact a levy on carbon emissions, case law suggests its should be
broad in scope rather than limited to a single sector, such as motor
vehicles, to shield it from a preemption suit. One of the weaknesses
the court found in the regime discussed in Metro. Taxicab was its
apparent regulation of fuel standards specifically. 119 The court
suggested, however, that had the regime applied to fuel costs more
broadly, and did not attempt to regulate motor vehicle fuel economy
in particular, the scheme would have had a greater chance of
surviving scrutiny. 12 Consequently, were New York City to levy a
carbon charge that impacted motor vehicles, it should consider tying
it to fuel usage more broadly, rather than have it relate to a car's fuel
efficiency.
For these reasons, were New York City to impose a local carbon
charge, it is possible, if not likely, that it would survive the various
federally inspired challenges. At its most basic, the carbon charge
discussed here seeks to regulate an area of truly local concern, health
and the environment. As a result, the courts would likely take a
forgiving view of such a fee, especially if it were broadly based.
While it is impossible to judge the legality of any statute in advance,
current law suggests that a carbon charge is at least theoretically
permissible.
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Metro. Taxicab
Bd. of Trade v. City offN.Y, No. 09-2901 CV (2d Cir. July 27, 2010).
118. Ass'n of Taxicab Operators, USA v. City of Dallas, 760 F.Supp.2d
693, 697-98 (N.D. Texas 2010).
119. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, 615 F.3d at 158.
120. Id.
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II. THE NEW YORK CITY CARBON CHARGE ("NY3C")
Assuming that New York City is legally permitted to impose a
burden-offset fee aimed at having persons internalize the costs of
emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the question remains
how such a fee regime would operate in practice. A so-called New
York City Carbon Charge ("NY3C")121 should be broad-based so as
to place all emitters on equal footing, regardless of industry or special
interest, and to reduce the fee to the lowest possible cost. That being
said, total regulation of all carbon emissions would likely be
administratively and economically impossible. Therefore, the NY3C
should begin with the largest emitters and aim to regulate smaller
sources of carbon only after the program has proved successful.
The largest sources of carbon emissions in New York City are, in
descending order, buildings, transportation, and carbon released from
waste, also known as "fugitive" emissions. 122 In 2013, buildings
represented approximately 70% of total emissions, at 33.8 million
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (hereinafter "tCO2e"). 123
Transportation represented 24% of emissions at 11.4 million
tCO2e. 124 Finally, fugitive emissions accounted for 6% of total
emissions at 2.8 million tCO2e. 125 Considering all of the sources
together, 64.8% of emissions came from burning various fuels,
126
32.8% from the consumption of electricity, and 2.4% from the
release of steam. 
127
To create an effective carbon charge regime, levies should be
narrowly tailored to address specific sources. For instance, with
respect to buildings, approximately 52% of carbon emissions are
121. Pronounced "en-why-try-see."
122. Inventory of New York City of New York, Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, November 2014, by Cathy Pasion, Mikael Amar, and Michael
Delaney, Mayor's Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, New
York, 2014, available at
www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/NYCGHGInventory_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DR4F-5CHU].
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Fuel oil, natural gas, diesel, ethanol, gasoline, methane, sulfur
hexafluoride, and nitrous oxide.
127. Inventory of New York City Greenhouse Gas Emissions at 10.
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generated from burning fuels, such as natural gas, biofuels, and
heavy oils, 44% from electricity consumption, and the rest from
steam. 128 Buildings are ideal candidates for the imposition of a
carbon charge because they are stationary and thus cannot migrate to
other jurisdictions to avoid regulation. Consequently, imposing the
NY3C on buildings should be as simple as adding a surcharge to all
electricity and fuels purchased by buildings. The fee could operate
like a sales tax, imposed on the purchaser, but reported and remitted
by the seller. Such piggybacking could drive down the
administrative cost of collection and increase compliance.
Furthermore, the relatively small number of electricity and fuel
suppliers could ease enforcement.
One concern with an electricity surcharge is that not all electricity
is created equal. Electricity derived from coal-fired power plants
generates substantially more carbon dioxide than electricity created
from wind and solar utilities. Thus ideally the NY3C would reflect
these differences by imposing a higher cost on the price of coal-
derived electricity versus other, less carbon intensive, sources of
electricity. Electricity generated by wind, solar, and other carbon
neutral sources could be exempt from the charge. Such a regime
would more accurately reflect a building's actual environmental
impact and would have the additional effect of encouraging building
owners to switch from more carbon intensive sources of electricity to
less intensive ones. To survive a legal challenge, the fee would not
likely have to perfectly capture the impact of each type of electricity,
but rather would need to only be reasonable and based on reliable
factual studies and statistics.
129
While the NY3C may be relatively simple to impose on buildings,
tailoring it to transportation-related emissions would be substantially
more difficult. Unlike buildings, transportation sources are mobile
and thus inherently more difficult to regulate. Vehicles emit carbon
only when they are turned on and then do so at multiple locations
during a given time period. Consequently, without some form of
invasive monitoring, the NY3C could not easily account for the exact
amount of carbon emitted by a particular vehicle. 13 Furthermore,
128. Id. at 12.
129. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 40 N.Y.2d at 163.
130. New York City could likely impose such a monitoring system on all
city-owned transportation sources without offending any privacy concerns,
but could not likely conduct such monitoring on private citizens.
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many of the vehicles that contribute to New York City's
transportation-related emissions come from outside of the city's
territorial jurisdiction, raising potential dormant commerce clause
concerns. In spite of these difficulties, imposing the NY3C on
transportation sources is possible.
Of the carbon dioxide emitted from transportation sources within
the city, 87% comes from the burning of fuel by vehicles. 13 1 One
way to capture the cost of these emissions would be to impose the
charge at the point of sale of gasoline and diesel purchased at fueling
stations throughout the city. Fueling stations, unlike the vehicles that
purchase the fuel, are stationary. One problem with this method,
however, is that not all of the fuel purchased by motorists in New
York City is consumed entirely within the city limits. As a result,
imposing the NY3C this way might offend the dormant commerce
clause by allowing New York City to effectively impose a fee on
carbon dioxide emitted outside of its jurisdiction. However, a court
may find that the impact to foreign residents is sufficiently incidental
to have the charge survive a Pike analysis.
Another possibility would be to charge a flat fee whenever vehicles
entered the five boroughs - a kind of carbon toll. An iteration of this
idea, congestion pricing, was first proposed by former mayor
Michael Bloomberg in 2010. Under Mayor Bloomberg's proposed
congestion pricing regime, vehicles were to be charged an $8 daily
fee if they traveled within Manhattan's core in Midtown and lower
Manhattan. The fee was to be collected when entering Manhattan
through any of its bridges or tunnels. 133 If a vehicle managed to enter
Manhattan without traversing a toll bridge or tunnel, the fee was to
be paid via the E-ZPass electronic tolling system or through cash and
credit card payment channels at retail stores, telephone and web-
based systems. 134 The NY3C could be similarly imposed at toll
bridges or through the other means identified in the Bloomberg
Congestion Pricing regime.
131. Inventory of New York City Greenhouse Gas Emissions at 14.
132. New York City's Congestion Pricing Experience and Implications
for Road Pricing Acceptance in the United States, Transport Policy 17
(2010) 266-273, Bruce Schaller, p. 3, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/schallerpaper 2010trb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3WF-BF7W].
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Even if New York City were to employ all the collection methods
identified in Mayor Bloomberg's congestion pricing proposal, the
city would still have to devote substantial resources to enforcement
and infrastructure. EZ-Pass cameras would have to be set up
throughout Manhattan and personnel would have to be devoted to
policing vehicles that do not contain EZ-Pass hardware.
Additionally, a single flat rate would not accurately reflect the
variable carbon footprints of different vehicle types. This shortfall,
however, could be easily ameliorated by imposing different rates on
different types of vehicles, as is currently done for four-wheeled cars
and sixteen-wheeled trucks on Manhattan's toll bridges. An even
more refined NY3C would levy varying charges depending on
whether the vehicle was a standard automobile, hybrid, or all electric.
However, if the charge was levied in this way it could be found to be
preempted by the Energy Policy Conservation law. 135
Fees on so-called fugitive emissions would be comparatively
simple to impose because, like buildings, such sources are stationary
or follow predictable paths. In New York City, 72.6% of fugitive
emissions are generated from solid waste, 15.8% from utilities, and
7.9% from wastewater treatment. 136 Because most of these sources
do not move, the city could audit water utilities and waste
management facilities on a yearly basis. Fees would reflect the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted. The fee could then be paid in the
subsequent year, on a quarterly basis. The increased cost paid by
such facilities would then likely be shifted to consumers in the form
of higher prices for waste disposal.
Alternatively, the city could impose a charge on each pound of
trash delivered to landfill and on each cubic centimeter of wastewater
discharged into the sewage system. The benefit of such a system
would be to impose a direct cost on waste generators, encouraging
them to conserve or otherwise change their behavior. However,
implementing such a system would likely require large investments
in new monitoring infrastructure. Given that fugitive sources of
emissions account for only 6% of the city's total carbon footprint,
implementing such a regime would likely be too costly relative to its
benefit.
135. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of NY, 615 F.3d 152 (2d
Cir. 2010).
136. Inventory of New York City Greenhouse Gas Emissions at 15.
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In order for any New York City carbon charge to survive scrutiny,
it must not only be imposed in a way that rationally relates to the
activity being regulated, but the funds derived must be sequestered
from the city's general revenue and restricted to registration,
inspection, and enforcement activities related to the NY3C. Even if
the monies collected are diverted towards clean energy infrastructure
projects, like subsidizing efficiency upgrades for buildings and
vehicles or the building of utility-scale renewable energy power
plants, the charge could be struck down as an impermissible tax used
to fund general improvement projects. 137 It is unclear whether the
revenue could be spent on relevant education, outreach, and
programing or on grants to universities and climate change related
non-profits.
CONCLUSION
Carbon dioxide, while harmless in limited quantities, has become
toxic to our way of life. As a result, governments from Toronto to
Tokyo have begun taking measures to limit their carbon dioxide
emissions. Due to the peculiarities of the United States federalist
system, and the politicization of the climate change debate, a
comprehensive and durable national response to climate change has
remained elusive. In spite of this, the ability of local subdivisions to
enact aggressive climate-related policies may be simpler than
previously imagined.
As has been demonstrated, localities hold great power to combat
climate change if they rely on their historic authority to regulate the
health and welfare of their citizens within their jurisdiction. Because
large urban areas are the principal drivers of carbon dioxide
emissions in the United States, municipalities are uniquely suited to
combat this phantom menace.
This paper has shown that New York City could likely implement
a market-oriented fee regime that would dramatically dampen carbon
emissions. State and local laws throughout the country similarly
provide localities with great latitude to regulate air-born pollution,
like carbon dioxide. As a result, while this paper has focused
137. See Torsoe Bros. Const. Corp. v. Board of Trustees of Inc. Village of
Monroe, 375 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1975).
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exclusively on New York City and New York state law, its reach
potentially extends far beyond the Big Apple.
The populations of large urban areas have been the most receptive
to arguments concerning climate change and are the most motivated
to address its ills. 138 Thus today power and politics are aligned in
cities to implement aggressive and comprehensive climate policies.
Cities need only recognize their incredible influence in order to help
steer this country, and even the world, onto a more sustainable path.
138. Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, available at
http://environment.yale.edu/poe/v2014/ [https://perma.cc/43XH-GWUB].
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